Dr. Tsien of Red China

     Dr. Tsien of Red China
        Of all the experts whom I suggested for the Air Force
Scientific Advisory Group in 1945, my friend Hsue-shen Tsien, then one
of the nation's leading rocket scientists, subsequently gained the
most notoriety. His story is a strange one - one that has not been
told in detail before - and I tell it here because I think it holds
important lessons for all of us on the problems of science and
politics and simple human justice.

        Tsien, an early member of the Cal Tech rocketry group, had
continued to contribute strongly to United States rocket research
during the war. At the age of thirty-six, he was an undisputed genius
whose work was providing enormous impetus to advances in high-speed
aerodynamics and jet propulsion. For these reasons I nominated him for
membership on the Scientific Advisory Group.

        Despite his skills, reputation, and efforts on behalf of the
United States, Tsien was accused in 1950 of being an alien Communist
and thus of being a danger to his adopted country. He was arrested by
the Immigration Service as he was about to leave for China, kept in
custody for two weeks, and subsequently help in the United States
against his will for five years, under constant threat of deportation.
In 1955, bitter over what he felt had been unjust treatment, he packed
up his belongings and returned to his homeland.

        Today Tsien holds a position of considerable scientific
eminence in Red China. There have been rumors in the press that he has
been associated with China's development of a nuclear bomb. This is
probably not true, but Tsien's early interest in nuclear rocketry may
have enabled him to play some part in Chinese nuclear research and
development. (* Footnote: This prediction has turned out to be quite
true. On Ockober 27, 1966, China announced the successful explosion of
a missile with a nulear warhead. Responsibility for this achievement
was placed on Tsien. Thus in a scant ten years the former Cal Tech
scientist has made China a potential missile power.) In any case, the
United States in effect gave Red China one of our most brilliant
rocket experts for no really good reasons.
        
        How could this tragedy for America have come about? To answer
this question, let me start by telling you about Tsien. Tsien was born
in Shanghai, and grew up in Peking (the heartland of the grandeur of
Old China, as he described it), where he attended a special high
school for talented youngsters. He went on to study engineeromg at
Chiao Tung University in Shanghai, and in 1935 he won a Boxer
Rebellion Scholarship, which enabled him to go to the United States
and take a Master's degree at M.I.T. One day in 1936 he came to see me
for advice on further graduate studies. This was our first meeting. I
looked up to observe a slight short young man, with a serious look,
who answered my questions with unusual precision. I was immediately
impressed with the keenness and quickness of his mind, and I suggested
that he enroll at Cal Tech for advanced study.

        Tsien agreed, He worked with me on many mathematical problems.
I found him to be quite imaginatice, with a mathematical aptitude
which he combined successfully with a great ability to visualize
accurately the physical picture of natural phenomena. Even as a young
student he helped clear up some of my own ideas on several difficult
topics. These are gifts which I had not often encountered and Tsien
and I became close colleagues.

        He was quickly noticed by other professors on the campus. I
remember that Professor Paul S. Epstein of the Physica Department, a
great theoretician, once said to me: "Your student H. S. Tsien is in
one of my classes. He is brilllant."

        "Ja, he is good," I replied.

        "Tell me," Epstein said witha a twinkle in his eys. "Do you
think he has Jewish blood?"
        
        Tsien enjoyed visiting my home, and my sister took to him
because of his interesting ideas and straightforward manner. He
enjoyed conjuring up novel proposals. I recall that in the early days
of experiments with guided missiles Tsien, sensing their growing
importance, suggested more or less jokingly that the United States
start a new service, to be known as the Jet Weapons Branch, which
would concentrate on remotely controlled missiles. He pointed out,
quite rightly as it turned out, that the skills were quite different
from those required for operating other kinds of weapons and should be
entrusted to a new group and a new way of thinking in the military
services. He even proposed we establish a society for the advancement
of jet propulsion and added wryly, "We might be able to get to be
Billy Mitchells."

        Tsien contributed substantially to Cal Tech's JATO program,
and when he later accepted my invitation to join the Scientific
Advisory Group of the Air Force, I was pleased to take him along with
me to Germany toward the war's end to look into Hitler's secret
technical developments. With Drs. Hugh Dryden and Frank Wattendorf,
Tsien inspected the famous Kochel and Otztal wind tunnels, which were
to influence Wattendorf into suggesting similar equipment in the
United States and to give rise to the Arnold Engineering Center at
Tullahoma. He was with me at Gottingen when I found myself in the
position of interrogating my old teacher, Ludwig Prandtl. What a
string meeting: my most brilliant student, who was to join Red China,
together with my own great teacher, who worked for Nazi Germany. How
odd of circumstance to separate three aerodynamicists who wanted
nothing more in life than to work together in harmony.

        On campus at Cal Tech, Tsien was not the most popular
professor because he was sharp, impatient, and inclined to be a little
arrogant with students. But I felt it ws worthwhile for students to
come in contact with him and to see how he approached technical
problems. With me he remained enormously respectful, and though we
became close friends he always addressed me in the manner of the old
Chinese, as "my revered teacher," which in China is perhaps the
greatest compliment one person can bestow on another. In February
1947, I was happy to recommend him for a full professorship at M.I.T.

        Shortly thereafter Tsien received word from China that his
mother had died. He decided to go to his native land to comfort his
aging father. It was his first visit in twelve years. In a long letter
a few months later he told me quite graphically about the poverty and
misery he had found in his homeland, which was then in Nationalist
hands, and he reported on the whereabouts of some of my former
students. He concluded his letter by informing me quite casually that
he had married a girl from Shanghai named Yin Tsiang, whom he was
bringing back to the States. She proved to be a lovely cosmopolite,
with a talent for singing, who had studied lieder in Berlin and later
in Zurich under a Hungarian soprano. Tsien, who loved music, seemed
very happy, and I was delighted that he'd found a wife with
international leanings.

        Tsien didn't memtion it, but I heard later that while in China
he had turned down the presidency of his alma mater, Chiao Tung
University. He wished to continue in the United States.

        When he returned to M.I.T., I don't think he or indeed any of
us had any idea of what lay in store for him. He continued teaching at
M.I.T. for two years or so, and then returned to Cal Tech as Goddard
Professor of Jet Propulsion and head of the Daniel and Florence
Guggenheim Jet Propulsion Center, a new organization which had been
founded in 1949 by Harry Guggenheim, President of the Daniel and
Florence Guggenheim Foundation, to encourage research in this exciting
new form of propulsion. Tsien was interested in the possibility of
developing nuclear engines and was looking forward to carrying out the
appropriate research at Cal Tech. In fact in 1949 he wrote the first
good paper in nuclear rocketry, which is today regarded as a kind of
classic in the field.

        At this time, however, the McCarthy-led Communist hunt was in
full pursuit in the United States. There was hysteria throughout the
country over the loyalty of employees in government. Investigations,
or threatened investigations, of universities, military installations,
and other agencies were almost daily occurrences. It was inevitable
that attention would be turned to Cal Tech, the little California
institution with the reputation of harboring many odd, independent
scientists. Anyone who had lived through the 1936-1939 period of Cal
Tech was in danger of eventually being labeled a security rish in the
1940's. Many fine people later had to go through the difficult and
embarrassing procedure of clearing themselves on appeal.

        One day suspicion fell on Tsien. It may have begun when he was
asked to give evidence against a research chemist named Sidney
Weinbaum, who was being tried in Pasadena for perjury in a case having
to do with Communism. Tsien had been a social acquaintance of the
Weinbaums. He had recommended Weinbaum for a job, and he visited the
Weinbaums' home often to listen to classical music.

        Tsien refused to testify against his friends. I am told that
this turned the FBI's attention to him (though it may have occurred
earlier during the initial investigation of Weinbaum and his friends).
In any case, it resulted in July 1950 in the military services' sudden
and unexpected withdrawal of Tsien's security clearance.

        Tsien's initial reaction was one of deep hurt. He sought an
interview with President Lee DuBridge of Cal Tech and informed him
that he couldn't do research in jet propulsion without clearance and
he added emotionally that he preferred to return to his family in
China rather than remain in the States under such a cloud of
suspicion. DuBridge calmed him down and advised him to appeal the
decision. Tsien was not anxious to go through the appeal procedure
because he felt, as did many of his friends, that in the tense
atmosphere of the times an alien Chinese professor didn't have much
change of winning the case. Besides, Tsien was very proud and he
didn't believe that he should have to prove to the authorities that he
wasn't a Communist. I believe my own reaction would have been about
the same as Tsien's if somebody had falsely accused me of Communism as
a result of my brief association with the short-lived Bela Kun
government of Hungary.

        I was in Europe at the time Tsien's clearance was lifted, but
I heard about it from President DuBridge, whereupon I immediately
wrote to Tsien, expressing my shock and telling him that I would do
what I could for him. Many important people came to the support of
Tsien. Dr. DuBrige consulted various authorities in Washington. Bill
Zisch (later President of Aerojet-General Corporation) went to the
Pentagon and reviewed the case with Admiral Inglis, Chief of Naval
Intelligence, but was unable to make headway.

        Tsien sought an audience with Dan Kimball, who as
Undersecretary of the Navy, had ultimate responsibility for some of
Tsien's projects at the Jet Propulsion Center. Tsien informed Kimball
that he intended to return to China if his clearance was not restored.
When nothing happened, Tsien made up his mind. He phoned the
Undersecretary and informed him that he was on his way.

        Kimball became quite excited and notified the Immigration
Service. He intimated to me later that he made this move because he
was afraid that if Tsien went to China the Communists might strip him
of his knowledge of United States military secrets in jet propulsion
research. He also didn't want the United States to lose a valuable
scientist. I couldn't help thinking that Kimball was also concerned
that he might be in trouble with the Navy and Congress if it became
known that Tsien went to Red China with the knowledge of the
Undersecretary.

        When Kimball informed Immigration officials of Tsien's
intentions, I am sure he expected no harm to befall Tsien. He thought
quite probably that the Immigration agents would merely detain him
briefly and let him return to Pasadena. Kimball in fact told me there
was not the slightest evidence against Tsien, and the case would be
cleared up on appeal. But I think Kimball was surprised and perhaps
shocked at how quickly the whole thing got out of hand. One of my
colleagues told me that the Immigration Service has a record as one of
the most arbitrary of government departments, and it seemed to be
true. They not only detained Tsien. They also searched him, treated
him rudely, and held him for fourteen days in a detention room at
Terminal Island. When he was released, it was on heavy bail.

        On top of that, customs officials impounded his luggage,
including 1800 pounds of books and notes. It was claimed that some
classified material was among them and reported in the world's press
that a "Communist agent" had attempted to leave the country with
secret documents. This was false, of course. In fact, I heard that
Tsien had been conscientious enough to have Clark Millikan check all
his papers before he packed them. Subsequently the U.S. Attorney in
Pasadena went through all of Tsien's material and cleared him of the
charge of removing classified documents.

        However, in October 1950, the Immigration Service ordered a
deportation hearing under the McCarran Act, claiming that Tsien was a
Communist alien and therefore had illegally reentered the United
States in 1947. Thus this proud and cultured man, who had only a
couple of years before received the highest praise from the United
States government, found himself in the position of being mistrusted
and in danger of being thrown out of the country he had adopted.

        Tsien became quite morose and was unable to concentrate on
technical problems. Many of his colleagues, particularly Professors
William Sears and Frank Marble, talked to him and tried to console
him. I phoned him from Europe, where I was setting up an aeronautical
research organization for NATO, and attempted to convince him that in
America there were many people who suspect scientists, especially if
they have a foreign accent. I told him to take such things
philosophically and to bury himself in books or in writting a report.
Tsien seemed heartened by my talking with him but he soon again lapsed
into despondency. At times I actually feared for his mind.

        I was convinced, as were virtually all my associates,
including Clark Millikan, the excellent Dean Ernest C. Watson, William
Zisch, George S. Schairer, and President Lee DuBridge, that Tsien was
not a member of the Communist Party or had had anything more thatn
social associations with some individuals who were later identified as
Communists or Communist sympathizers. A number of us felt, however,
that while such "evidence" against Tsien as was available could not be
acceptable in a court of law, the Immigration Service tended to act on
hearsay, and on relatively flimsy evidence. Several hearings were
held. My friend Professor Marble told me that in one of them two
former Los Angeles policemen said they had seen Tsien's name on what
they described as cards identifying Communist Party members. The
handwriting, however, was not Tsien's and it seemed there were many
other suspicious descrepancies.

        Professor Marble also told me that a Communist professor was
asked to identify Tsien as a fellow member and at first had refused to
testify because he said the charges against Tsien were not true.
Suddenly this professor was indicted on a four-year-old perjury
charge. Subsequently he appeared as witness against Tsien. His
"damaging" statements were that he "assumed" that Tsien was a member
of the Communist Party because he saw him at alleged Communist
meetings.

        The pasadena Immigration Office ordered Tsien deported, and
there was even a threat of indicting him for perjury for saying that
he was not a Communist. In the end, Tsien was kept in the United
States for five years, which led China to declare in a public
statement that the United States was holding a Chinese citizen against
his will.

        The theory behind Tsien's detention was that everything he
then knew would be obsolete. Tsien continued his teaching at Cal Tech,
but he had to report once a month to the Immigration Service. This was
galling to him. He never gave up his resolve to go to China because he
felt only CHina had helped him by seeking his release and he thought
he would be treated with dignity there. I think too, that Tsien
thought that because of my strong ties with Washington I could have
done more for him that I had done. The sad truth is that in this time
of unreason one could do little once these situations started, even
with the strongest of auspices.

        Tsien, his wife Yin, and their two children left in 1955.
There was a rumor that he had been swapped in Warsaw for an Allied
prisoner in Red hands, but I do not think this is true. In any case
the Chinese government was delighted to get him. Thus one of America's
greatest talents in the rocket field, and my outstanding student, was
handed to the Communists.

        I heard from Tsien in 1956, when he invited me to attend the
Benjamin Franklin Anniversary in Peking and to see my old study at
Tsing Hua University. He added that I should not expect to talk to his
children because they thought English was a funny language and were no
longer able to converse in English. Unfortunately I was unable to go
and had to decline. He sent me one more letter after that in 1060, a
formal note saying that he couldn't attend an international comgress,
to which I had invited him, if Formosan representatives were invited,
because there was only one China. I wrote back that at the Congress
there would be no representatives of nations - only scientists.

        Today Tsien is director of the Institute of Mechanics in
Peking, which is a part of the Chinese Academia Sinica, and I suspect
one of the leading figures in rocket technology. I have heard that he
lives in a compound near the university, but seldom leaves his
country, though he was seen at least once on a visit to Moscow. I have
not learned whether he is any happier in Peking than when he was here.


        The problem of security, I believe, got out of hand during the
1950's. I am not opposed to a reasonable security, but I must say that
governments often pass foolish and harmful laws in this area. I recall
talking about security shortly after the Alan Nunn May and Klaus Fuchs
cases in England in which both men were convicted of turning over
secret plans to the enemy. I believe that the effectiveness of this
kind of spying is exaggerated in the mind of the public. The important
thing is to find out what subjects the other side is seriously
interested in, and this can often be discovered without going to great
lengths. If I know the main line of thought, I can work out the
details.

        I recall, for instance, that in Russia a lady scientist asked
me whether or not I knew of any work on the mathematical theory of the
strength of ice sheets under a movable load.

        I replied: "Oh, you must be interested in the problem of
ferrying tanks across Lak Baikal in winter."

        The lady paled and seemed nervous. I smiled: "Do not fret.
There is a famous work on this subject. It was written by Helmholtz in
1870."

        Governments are generally incapable of seeing the broad
picture of the future.  As a result many of their representatives
become pedantic.  In Germany, for instance, before World War II, a
German worker would have been shot for espionage if he were found
illegally carrying a bolt out of a factory. But the German authorities
made no objection to the publication of Professor Otto Hahn's paper on
nuclear fission or to letting Hahn's associate, Lise Meitner, leave
the country for Sweden, where she eventually arranged to bring her
information on splitting the atom to Bohr in Copenhagen, who later
transmitted it to scientists in the U.S. Thus, the Germans themselves
forged one of the most important links in America's development of the
A-bomb.