Schumpeter
熊彼特
The end of the affair
緣分到頭
How to prevent business break-ups—or end them amicably
商業聯盟如何避免關係破裂——或者該怎麼和平分手
It has been a week of romantic second-chances in the business world. On March 11th Barrick Gold, the world’s most valuable gold producer, said it would no longer pursue its $17.8bn hostile quest for Newmont Mining, its nearest rival. Instead both parties agreed to form a joint venture (JV) to create the world’s largest gold-mining site, in north-eastern Nevada. The tie-up cemented the view that the state is the easiest place to get hitched in America.
近些天，商界不乏“再續前緣”的浪漫戲碼。本月 11 日，全球市值最高的黃金生產商巴里克黃金公司（Barrick Gold）表示，將不再推進對其頭號競爭對手紐蒙特礦業公司（Newmont Mining）價值 178 億美元的惡意收購計劃。相反，雙方同意組建一家合資企業，在內華達州東北部打造全球最大的金礦。這項合作印證了一種說法——內華達是全美國結婚最方便的地方。
A day later in Japan, the partners in what had become the business world’s most spectacular falling-out announced a “new start” to their ménage-à-trois. Renault, Nissan and Mitsubishi launched a “consensus-based” board to replace the command-and-control structure imposed by Carlos Ghosn, who chaired all three companies until his arrest in Japan on charges of financial misconduct (which he denies). The aim is to rekindle the romance that began when Renault first rescued Nissan from near-bankruptcy in 1999.
一天後，在日本，原本鬧出商界最大失和事件的各方宣佈啓動三角關係“新起點”。雷諾、日產和三菱成立了一個“基於共識”的董事會，取代了卡洛斯·戈恩（Carlos Ghosn）施行的管控體系。戈恩之前兼任三家公司的董事長，直至因涉嫌財務違規在日本被捕（但他否認有罪）。此番調整的目標是要重燃始於 1999 年的舊情，那一年雷諾首次將日產從破產邊緣解救出來。
Such JVS and strategic alliances, however schmaltzy, receive too little attention as business entities. They lack the swashbuckling allure of mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Investment bankers shun them because they generate few fees. Yet they are indispensable. They enable businesses to collaborate without entering the touchy terrain of changing who controls them. The RenaultNissan-Mitsubishi alliance is a car-producing powerhouse. But it is also a textbook example of why such structures often go wrong.
如此組建的合資企業和戰略聯盟不管有多煽情，獲得的關注都很少。它們缺乏併購的那種驚心動魄。投資銀行家繞道而行，因爲他們能從中收取的費用太少。但這樣的交易不可或缺。它們讓企業無需觸及敏感的更換控制權問題就能建立協作。雷諾 – 日產 – 三菱聯盟是一個強大的汽車生產集團，卻也是示例說明這類結構爲何往往會出問題的教科書式典型。
JVS and strategic alliances are structured differently but share some characteristics. As pwc, an accountancy firm, describes it, a jv enables companies to pool resources in a separate business entity, like the Nevada gold company. An alliance is looser; it allows firms to share production platforms, for instance, which lets them preserve more autonomy, as in the car industry. In an era of globalisation, blurred lines between industries and technological disruption, such ad hoc relationships become more important. Firms want to keep their options open, rather than undergoing the Herculean task of buying and integrating a firm that may not provide the answers to the challenges of the age. By some estimates, the value of JVS and alliances is growing even faster than m&a.
合資企業和戰略聯盟雖然結構不同，但仍有一些共通之處。正如會計師事務所普華永道所說的，合資企業能把多家公司的資源集中到一個獨立的商業實體中，就像內華達州的黃金公司那樣。企業聯盟在結構上更鬆散。比如，聯盟的成員企業可以共享生產平臺，從而保留更大的自主權，正如在汽車行業所見的那樣。在一個全球化、行業間界限模糊、科技破舊立新的時代，企業聯盟這類臨時關係就變得更加重要。企業希望保留選擇權，而不想經歷併購或是整合這種可能無法應對時代挑戰的艱鉅任務。據一些估計，合資企業和商業聯盟的價值增長速度甚至超越了併購。
The partnerships share some overlapping motivations. The most common is to enable cross-border transactions. In some countries (like China) and some industries (like airlines), they have been a key way to enter new markets. Call these long-distance relationships. A second is access to new products and technologies; pharmaceutical firms forming partnerships with biotech companies, for example. In other words, friends with benefits. The most traditional rationale is cost-savings, which underpins Barrick-Newmont’s jv. This is a bit like civil unions: closely akin to marriage, but not quite. The most modern motivation is to avoid the threat of strategic disruption. In the car industry, for instance, electrification and autonomous driving are forcing companies to pool ideas. A study by the Boston Consulting Group says that a typical European carmaker has more than 30 partners across five different industries in a handful of countries. Call this constructive promiscuity: sleeping around to gain experience.
這類夥伴關係有一些共同的動機。最常見的是方便跨境交易。在一些國家（如中國）和一些行業（如航空業），這是打入新市場的主要途徑。不妨稱之爲“異地戀”。第二常見的是爲獲取新產品和技術，例如製藥公司與生物技術公司建立的合作。這可以叫做“牀伴”關係。最傳統的理由是爲節省成本，巴里克 – 紐蒙特的合資就是出於這個原因。這有點像“民事結合”：非常近似於婚姻，又不完全是。最現代的動機是避免戰略性顛覆的威脅。例如在汽車行業，電氣化和自動駕駛正迫使汽車廠商聯手謀劃應對之計。波士頓諮詢集團的研究表明，一般而言，一家歐洲汽車製造商擁有 30 多個分佈在多個國家的五個不同行業裏的合作伙伴。可稱之爲“建設性濫交”：爲增長經驗而到處留情。
While hookups may be easier to pull off than a full-scale merger, they often end in tears. According to Water Street Partners, a consultancy, only around half succeed. Common reasons why they go wrong include partners’ changing strategic objectives, new executives finding them tedious, and culture clashes. Under Mr Ghosn, the Renault-Nissan-Mitsubishi alliance eventually came to exemplify many of their worst traits. It and other tie-ups could do with a corporate equivalent of a “prenup” clause—a legal contract stating how to terminate the relationship when the passion runs out.
雖然這類短暫隨意的“勾搭”也許比全面合併更易實現，但也常常以眼淚收場。據諮詢公司 Water Street Partners 稱，這類合作的成功率只有約 50%。失敗往往是因爲合作伙伴改變戰略目標，或新主管認爲這種關係索然無味，還有就是文化衝突。在戈恩的領導下，雷諾 – 日產 – 三菱聯盟最終成爲一個典型，體現了這種關係的諸多最糟糕的特徵。該聯盟及其他類似的合作關係可以訂立“婚前協議”的企業版本，明確在激情褪去時如何終止關係。
The Franco-Japanese fling started out well, with a clear, limited aim: Mr Ghosn was parachuted in by Renault to rescue Nissan. Then the focus turned to preserving each firm’s independence and sharing costs such as purchasing. Though there were cross-shareholdings, their main objective was not control.
雷諾 – 日產 – 三菱這段法日情緣一開始是好的，目標清晰而有限度：雷諾空降戈恩來拯救日產。之後，工作的焦點轉向保持各家公司的獨立性並分擔採購等方面的成本。雖然存在交叉持股，但各方的主要目標不在於爭奪控制權。
But as often happens in partnerships, control eventually became a problem. Mr Ghosn began to consider a full-scale merger, on terms the Japanese executives feared would be unequal—even though Nissan had become the stronger partner. The alliance had no governance structures in place for dealing with such questions; it was shaped largely by the force of Mr Ghosn’s personality. That may be why things only came to a head when the police arrested him in Tokyo last November.
但正如婚戀關係中常見的那樣，控制權最終還是成爲了問題。戈恩開始考慮全面合併，而儘管日產已成爲較強大的一方，日方高管仍擔心合併條款會不平等。該聯盟並無適當的治理結構來處理這類問題，因爲它主要是由戈恩個人的人格力量塑造的。也許正因如此，警方去年 11 月在東京逮捕他時，聯盟才突然走到了緊急關頭。
It is a credit to the alliance that it has, at least for now, survived the bedroom brawl. On March 12th Jean-Dominique Senard, Renault’s chairman, took the helm of a new four-man board, that includes the bosses of the three car companies, and which aims to replace the patriarchal Mr Ghosn. To further mollify the Japanese, Mr Senard is likely to be vice-chairman of Nissan, not chairman.
所幸該聯盟總算是牀頭吵架牀尾和，至少目前如此。12 日，雷諾集團董事長讓-多米尼克·塞納德（Jean-Dominique Senard）執掌全新的四人董事會。該董事會由三家汽車公司的老闆組成，取代以往專權的戈恩。爲進一步安撫日本人，塞納德很可能只擔任日產的副董事長，而非董事長。
Behind the boardroom door
董事會門後
Some of the Ghosn-era shortcomings remain, however. Strategic objectives are still ill-defined. The questions of ownership continue to be taboo, even as the alliance moves further to combine operations. There are no rules for resolving disputes; Mr Senard said only that he would use his diplomatic skills if they arose. The potential for clashes persists (as Japanese journalists noted, Renault provides two of the alliance’s board members, Nissan and Mitsubishi one each). And there is no hint of a prenup.
然而，戈恩時代的一些弊端仍然存在。戰略目標依舊不明確。即使聯盟進一步趨於整合運營，所有權問題仍是個禁忌。解決糾紛仍無章可依。塞納德只是表示，如出現糾紛，他會運用自己的圓熟手腕來解決。發生衝突的可能性依舊存在（正如日本記者指出的，雷諾在董事會中佔了兩席，日產和三菱各佔一席）。而且毫無訂立“婚前協議”的跡象。
If partnerships want to adapt to new circumstances, taking evolving strategies and strong personalities in their stride, they should do what Renault-Nissan-Mitsubishi has failed to and establish clear rules of engagement—and disengagement, just as banks now have “living wills” to wind them down if disaster strikes. JVS and alliances are tricky to manage for a reason. The more successful they become, the more the question of control that they were set up to avoid will rear its ugly head.
合作關係如果想適應新形勢，從容應對戰略變化和強勢個人，就應該從雷諾 – 日產 – 三菱聯盟的例子裏汲取教訓，能其所不能，制定明確的合作規則，以及分離方式——就像銀行現在訂立“生前遺囑”明確在遭遇危機時如何有序倒閉那樣。合資企業和聯盟難以管理是有原因的。聯盟發展越是成功，成立之初意圖避免的控制權問題就越容易冒頭。